On the desirability and the implementation of a factor share policy for Malta by Delia, E. P.
ON THE DESIRABILITY AND THE 
IMPLEMENT ATION OF A F ACTOR SHARE 
POLICY FOR MALT A 
by E.P. DELlA* 
INTRODUCTI ON 
'WHAT is produced is distributed in the proces s of production' is a 
simple economic statement implying, as often happens, complex 
connotations. For, the interrelationship between the production 
and the distribution of a given output is oniy crudely understood in 
economic theory. In addition, ideological conflicts regarding asset 
ownership, income distribution and wealth accumulation render an 
understanding of the production - distribution relationship more 
difficult still to achieve. A recurring socio-political concensus, ef-
fected through Government policies, becomes therefore essential 
for the attainment of a series of partial solutions through time. 
The problematic relation between production and distribution 
could be briefly stated as follows: There exists the necessity, on 
the one hand, to examine the issue of how a quantity of commodit-
ies should be produced; to concentrate upon the optimal resource 
allocation, including sectoral shifts, devising incentives ge"ared 
mainly to production, with the aim to produce the highest attain-
able output. On the other hand, it is necessary to examine how 
distribution could be managed to exert the greatest influence on 
production without causing hardships, i.e., how to redistribute the 
growing national product among those who are active in production 
and also those who for valid reasons e.g. age or infirmity, are un-
able to participate in the productive process. Viewed thus distribu-
tion becomes an incentive or a brake to economic growth. 
If a Growth/Distribution trade-off is unavoidable, cooperation 
within a society becomes not only desirable but crucial. Political 
consensus, at least among the majority, is indispensable for socio-
economic development, the more so if social changes, considered 
radical from a community's traditional views, are called for. 
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This article applies various elements from several economic 
theories and models to the gradual transformations experienced by 
the Maltese economy over the twenty-year period recorded in the 
official National Accounts data, 1954-1973. Concentration is set 
upon the functional distribution of income during this period. The 
main observation rests upon the necessity to determine a relative 
factor-income distribution policy taking into account the restructur-
ing process continuously operating within the Maltese economy. In 
order to understand the motive for such a share policy the present 
structural state of the economy, together with the prevailing social 
attitudes, must be highlighted; in turn, any future projected schemes 
and resulting changes in economic and social aspirations would de-
mand to be integrated. within the present Maltese socio-economic 
structure. Although the argument could be very succintly introduc-
ed, the actual dimensions of the potential difficulties could only 
be realistically evaluated after a detailed analysis of the several 
factors involved is carried out. This paper therefore combines po-
licy with the state of theoretical debates about production and dis-
tribution relationship in economics, and with the underlying socio-
political situation in Malta at this time period. For this purpose, a 
theme is developed in every separate section; the observations in-
troduced help elucidate the intricate nature of the problems involv-
ed. The discovery and the study of a problem are the primary steps 
leading to a solution. 
An evaluation of the present Functional Income Distribution 
theoretical debate is submitted first; this is necessary to dispel 
any possible distorted views about an existing homogeneity of 
thought about this subject. The ambiguous role of the State in Eco-
nomics is emphasized, for no social policy can be implemented out-
side a political framework. The observed factor shares movements 
and the associated computational difficulties in Malta's Gross N a-
tional Product (GNP) for the past two decades are then discussed. 
Finally, selected characteristics and influences observed active in 
the Maltese economy are analysed in terms of their potential con-
tribution in assisting public policy making upon factor-shares. 
These inClude the need to distinguish between the Production and 
the Commercial profit motive; the linkages between economic 
growth and factor income distribution; the possibility of alternative 
employment and its relation to intersector and inter-country labour 
mobility; and the need to plan capital-labour intensity within pro-
duction units w~th the objective of being in a position to meet 
changing market needs and changing aspirations of investors and 
workers. 
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This paper is an introductory work; hopefully it should lead to a 
series of articles dealing with the personal income distribution, 
and the impact and repercussions of the Government budget upon 
household income in Malta. Such work could be rewardingly under-
taken when the required data become available. 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC 
THEORyl 
The distribution of the aggregate' output has long been acknow-
ledged by economists as an important element in the mechanism 
through which market forces function in an economic system. How-
ever, despite this awareness, the state of theoretical analysis 
about this subject remains uneasy. This follows from the lack of a 
coherent exposition in which distribution is accorded a degree of 
autonomy. Those analysts who emphasize the social element in 
distribution without minimizing the power of market forces, insist 
that people react as collectively conscious groups to the conditions 
under which the social product is allocated through primary distri-
bution. They emphasize that it is not enough to assume income dis-
tribution as an intermediate stage between production and income 
generation on the one hand, and spending or allocating distributed 
income to consumption and saving, on the other. If this were so, 
income distribution can be approached through production (follow-
ing the neo-marginalist, supply-oriented 'theories') or through ef-
fective demand (in accordance with post-Keynesian demand-orient-
ed 'theory') and the debate would be concluded. 
Economic thinking, however, appears to be converging upon the 
need to approach the distribution issue through an eclectic analy-
sis, difficult and problematic as that is. Theories about distribu-
tion need not be considered mutually exclusive. A theory could be 
regarded as attributing predominant influence to a particular pro-
cess of adjustment in the socio-economic system, and several pro-
cesses could be in action at the same time and react to one an-
other. 2 
The tenacity with which theorists have defended their selected 
views and attempt to rebutt the ideas of their academic opponents 
is understandable. At stake there are personal ideals and social 
lSee (i) Bronfenbrenner M.: 'Income Distribution Theory' (Macmillan 1971) 
(ii) Marchal J. and Dudos B. ed. '.1he Distribution of National Income 
- Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Asso-
ciation at Palermo' (Macmillan 1968). 
2See: Phelps-Brown E.H. 'Pay and Profits' (Manchester University Press 
1968) pp. 9-10. 
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convictions camouflaged as the source that inspires the behaviour-
al reactions and policy targets in the economic models constructed. 
Besides it sounds practical to integrate an analysis around a single 
tenet and thereafter concede shortcomings rather than produce 
eclectic models which, being highly complex and restrictive in the 
behavioural assumptions introduced, are rendered unsuitable for 
testing in a real world economy. 3 Theoretical expediency should 
be integrated with, rather than divorced from, pragmatic policy con-
siderations. 
The theory of functional distribution of income concerns the dis-
tribution of the social product among the factors of production 
which combine to produce it. To simplify exposition, productive 
factors are generally limited to two, Labour and Capital where the 
latter term is made to represent the non-labour factors of produc-
tion, namely, capital, land and entrepreneurship.4 The study of 
functional distribution reveals the shares accruing to factor labour, 
but not to the labourer, and to factor capital, but not to money lend-
ers, investors or land owners. The theory of functional distribution 
is thus by no means a theory of the distribution of incomes among 
factors of production. The size of the primary income i.e., income 
before tax deductions and transfer payments from Public sources 
are allowed for, going to every individual - the personal distribu-
tion of income - can be ascertained only when the amounts of la-
3See : Krelle W. 'The Laws of Distribution in the Short Run and in the 
Long Run: An Aggregative Model' (in Marchal/Ducros Ed. op. cit) 
4It is essential to distinguish between means of production and jacto.rs of 
production. For the purpose of studying the processes of production and 
the size of relative shares in the product, it may be convenient to utilise 
the concept of several factors of production. In a complete theory of the 
distribution of income, however, there is only one factor, name ly, labour; 
the rest are mecms of production. 
Reference should also be made to the current economic debate about 
the term and estimation of 'Capital' and the determination of 'a' profit 
rate. The debate in capital theory has led to the temporary conclusion 
that the value of capital cannot be known unless the rate of return or pro-
fit is given; this cannot therefore be used in turn to determine the rate of 
return on 'capital'. Relative bargaining power between owners of produc-
tive assets and labour rather than relative market forces determine who 
gets what in the allocation of the national product. 
See: Krege! J .A. 'Rate of Profit, Distribution and Growth: Two views' 
(Macmillan 1971). 
Blaug M.: 'The Cambridge Revolution: Success or Failure' (The 
Institute of Economic Affairs 1974). 
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bour and other productive inputs - land, liquid and/or fixed assets 
and their composition - at the disposal of every individual are 
known. 
Theories are meant to explain and not juSt describe interrelation-
ships within a system. Unfortunately, income distribution theories 
describe rather than explain the factor-commodity interre lationships 
in an economy. Analyses are carried out in 'real' terms within the 
context of a full-employment situation. The theoretical conclusions 
thus arrived at are, in turn, applied to interpreting the processes 
that could be presumed to have evolved in an economy in the at-
tempt to relate observed factor movements with the theoretical re-
sults e.g. in terms of the elasticity of substitution in a neo-classi-
cal set-up or in terms of a factor's propensity to save in a Kaldor-
ian approach. 
In addition, the application of theoretical results to real-world 
conditions must consider the role of the State in an economy. There-
fore, attempts to construct a framework for the derivation of econo-
mically optimal situations without accounting for value-judgements 
involving socio-political set-ups could lead to dead ends when po-
licy prescriptions are sought. The situation becomes confusing 
when analysis is carried out in compartmentalised steps introduc-
ing ambivalent roles to a main factor (in this case, the State) at 
different stages. This incongruency of the assumed behaviour of 
the State, and the possibility for a member of society to think un-
emotionally and disinterestedly are fundamental issues which have 
not been resolved. Failure to resolve them has meant an incomplete 
policy-oriented theoretical analysis of the distribution issue. 
Practitioners of 'Positive' ecqnomics base their approach upon 
existing political and social structures which they consider as da-
ta; their aim is to spell out the optimal social welfare conditions 
within such a framework, retaining fundamental the freedom of an 
individual to choose what to sell (labour services or goods) and 
what to consume. Accepting a given social structure and attempting 
to maximise welfare within such a constraint implies that the eco-
nomist would become a propagator of an existing system. For if 
the analysis could suggest that crucial changes in the social frame-
work itself is necessary for welfare maximisation, the approach 
adopted need no longer be entirely applicable; and, anyway, by de-
finition, theoretically optimal situations abstain from redistribution 
consideration. Analyses carried out in 'vacuum' or dated i.e. with-
in the constraints of a particular sodo-political framework, are 
destined to be of limited value to an understanding of the real 
world; they would lead, as they have actually led, to ambiguous 
28 
situations. Consider the role attributed to the State in economic 
theory. 
Welfare theory, based upon orthodox abstract microeconomics, 
starts from the premise that the State should refrain from disturbing 
the pattern of resource allocation as determined by market relation-
ships, except when the allocation is inconsistent with what it 
should be under perfect competitive conditions. The State's inter-
vention is a corrective force; it is solely justified for removing the 
distortions which obstruct the proper functioning of the economic 
system from attaining the presumed highest possible welfare level 
(however 'welfare' is defined). MisaIlocation of resources is attri-
buted to anyone, or a combination of two general categories of dis-
tortions, namely, a monopolistic market structure and externalities 
in production and consumption. These categories could, in reality, 
prove to be the rule rather than the exception; the concept of ex-
ternalities is very hard to define rigorously to meet real-world sit-
uations. State intervention could generally be recommended upon 
this tenet. With such an elastic rule, it is doubtful how practical 
it is to assert that the State should refrain from actively participat-
ing in the market economy. 
Directly opposite is the attitude of theoreticians towards the 
State in macrotheory. Macroeconomics considers the State the 
means whereby output growth is achieved with minimal friction in 
terms of rising prices or resource unemployment; still, in principle, 
a corrective force. Once active participation is envisaged for the 
State, however, it is unrealistic to assume that Government be-
comes a mere adjusting force that comes and goes without getting 
itself involved in the economic process. If the State is to be hand-
ed over the task of seeing that output growth is promoted with the 
minimal costs in terms of unemployment and social injustice - for, 
it must be recognized, that one man's 'equity' need not be another's 
notion of 'fairness' and, hence, injustice would become a subjec-
tive evaluation ·of events - it becomes difficult to relate this idea 
with the notion that while influencing the economy through the Pub-
lic Budget and appropriate legislation - introducing or modifying 
tax incentive schemes and income subsidies - the State is simul-
taneously forbidden to acquire productive assets. As the State ac-
cumulates assets, the balance of Power within an economy shifts 
and market structures and policy tools change accordingly. Dispas-
sionate intermediation by State Authorities in the real world is a 
myth; theorising on the premise of 'no government' become, there-
fore, a quasi-sterile mental exercise with little positive gains for 
practical policy making. 
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This is precisely the reason why current economic theory is un-
dergoing an intra-disciplinary ferment. Economic man and social 
man are one. In time certain ideas become accepted or are forced 
upon a resistent minority; other ideas are discarded. Though man-
kind changes very slowly in its basic aspirations, yet in his ways 
of expression Man can differ over time and places. Production, Dis-
tribution, Justice, Sympathy, Greed and Generosity are closely in-
terlinked; the means society implements to achieve social ideals, 
vaguely defined by its leaders, appear to derive force from the 
State Authorities that must somehow reflect the social pulse and 
brain. Consequently a Stateless, mechanical analysis could be de-
luding rather than illuminating. 
Development of theory is not the intent of this paper; rather it is 
the utilisation of the corpus of ideas in economics to Malta at a 
transitional stage of economic development. Crude and uneasy as 
theory is about the subject and related topics, it could be gainfully 
applied if its shortcomings are correctly and explicitly recognized. 
So the main contributions of different economic theories and models 
are briefly explained wherever deemed relevant; these are, in turn, 
used as a starting-point from which to discuss public policy impli-
cations. 
The following section submits a 'factual' assessment of relative 
shares of productive factors in Malta for the twenty year period, 
1954-1973. 
~tOVE:\IENTS OF RELATIVE FACTOR SHARES IN MALTA'S GNP: 1954-1973 
The observed behaviour of the relative factor shares in the Mal-
tese economy is presented, percentagewise, in Table 1;, the mean 
values by category for the four quinquenniums are given. Table 2 
submits a different activity classification for the same years. The 
two tables together enable one to meet certain obj ections about 
factor share allocation raised about similar studies for other eco-
nomies. The discrepancy in terminological usage between concepts 
in economic theory and their counterpart in National Accounting to-
gether with the difficulties met in allocating the proper sha're to a 
factor are discussed in notes (5) and (6). 
5 Economic theory defines 'wages' as the payment for human effort exert-
ed in the production process, 'rent' as the return to non-reproducible re-
sources supplied in fixed amounts by nature; 'interest' as the retum to 
non-human, reproducible means of production; and 'profits' as the re sid-
ual reward to entrepreneurship for risk-bearing, co-ordinating and inno-
vating activity. Factor rewards are, therefore, conceptually homogeneous 
and distinct. 
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The conceptual problems indicated in notes (5,6) render the task 
of interpreting movements in income shares a heavy one. The ob-
served changes in factor shares could result from measurement bias 
rather than the outcome of structural economic transformation. 
These difficulties are recognised as elements tending to weaken 
the reliability of empirical investigations. 
The data in Table 2 suggest a small increment in share accruing 
to factor labour; a relative increase in Public capital income, main-
ly in the form of interest and dividends, and a fourfold rise in Un-
In the National Accounts, however, the measures are formed of hetero-
geneous income ~lements. Thus, for example, labour income inc"ludes in-
determinate amount of 'interest' yie Id on investment in education and 
training plus 'r"~nt' on unique ability in addition to pure wage income. Al-
so included is entrepreneurial income because the salaries of company 
executives are added. " " 
6Self-Employment ('Mi~ed Income') has contributed, substantially to the 
GDP in Malta. The problem of attributing a share to Capital and a share 
to labour has everywhere proved controversial. At least three positions 
have been taken regarding its disposition. 
According to one view, it is virtually impossible to identify the 'labour' 
and 'capital' components and, therefore, any separation must be complete-
ly arbitrary. It is advocated that analysis should be limited to those sec-
tors of th'~ economy not" dominated by unincorpor ated forms of busine ss 
enterprises. 
A second view argues that proprietors' income is too important to ig-
nore and that it should be assigned to the labour category. Proponents of 
this vi~w rationalise that a large part of proprietors'" income goes to self-
employed professionals, e.g. doctors who are engaged predominantly in 
labour type activity. (Note that in the Maltese National Accounts 'retail-
ers' are included as a separate class). 
A third view is opposed to the complete allocation of proprietors' in-
come to labour because such a procedure implies that the prop~rty used 
by the self-employed in their work has a zero yield. Suggested tech-
niques advanced to obtain reasonabiy accurate disentanglement of the 
constituent parts of self-employed income i"nclude: 
(i) dividing the shares in the same ratio as they are divided in the cor-
porate sector; and 
(ii) imputing to each se If-employed person a labour income equivalent 
to the market yield on assets similar to those owned by the self-employed. 
In Table 2 we consider self-employment income as a separat"e item. 
Table 1 (b) aggregates wages and salaries and the income for farming, 
fishing and private services as suggested in "the second view above. It 
was not p"ossible" to follow suggestion (ii) of imputing a market value for 




MEAN VALUES PER QUINQUENNIUM OF FACTOR SHARES IN 
MALTA'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
1954-1973 - PERCENT 
ACTIVITY 1954-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-73 
1. Income from Employment 50.59 50.94 50.21 52.04 
2. Income from Farming, 
Fishing and Private 
Services 7.73 8.54 8.42 8.32 
3. Gross Trading Profits 28.04 27.17 27.52 25.42 
4. Gross Trading Surplus of 
Government Enterprises 0.80 0.70 1.04 1.11 
5. Income from Property 5.50 4.98 4.85 5.09 
6. Net Investment Income 
from Abroad 7.35 7.68 7.96 8.02 
(b) 
F ACTOR LABOUR 
(Items 1 and 2) 58.32 59.48 58.63 60.36 
F ACTOR CAPITAL 
(Items 3, 4, 5 34.34] 32.85 ] 33.41] 31.62] 
and 6 7.35 7.68 7.96 8.02 
41.69 40.53 42.37 39.64 
_ ...... _---- --_ ...... _--_ ....... __ .-~ ..... _-
---_ .... _--------
_. __ ..... - --
--
Source: Based on Table 1 National Accounts of the Maltese Islands 
(C.O.S. Malta.). 
distributed Company Profits. The share of Private Capital register-
ed a conspicuous decline in its 1959-63 mean value from that es-
timated for the preceeding quinquennium, but since then appears to 
have established itself at about twelve per cent of GNP. Could one 
interpret the change s in relative factor shares as being indic ati ve 
of the underlying transformation process in the Maltese economy 
over the past two decades? Although a definite answer would be 
hard to obtain, one could attempt to select certain factors that 
could be presumed to have influenced, or could potentially prove to 
be basic for socio-economic change. 
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Table 2 
MEAN VALUES PER QUINQUENNIUM OF FACTOR SHARES IN 
MALTA'S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
1954-1973 - PERCENT 
ACTIVITY 1954-58 1959-63 1964-68 1969-74 
Labour Incomes 53.22 50.90 50.21 52.02 
Mixed Incomes 29.07 29.92 27.17 20.92 
Private Capital 13.55 12.37 12.51 13.75 
Undistributed 
Company Profit 1.07 2.77 4.72 6.66 
Public Capital Income: 
Profits of Govt. Enterprises 0.50 0.50 1.04 1.35 I 
Rents 0.67 0.65 0.60 0.47 1 
Interests and Dividends 2.02 2.45 3.74 4.02 : 
3.19 3.60 5.38 5.84 
Source: Based on Tables 7 (or 6) in the 'National Accounts of the 
Maltese Islands' (C.O.S. Malta). 
Such structural factors affecting the intra- and inter-labour and 
non-labour shares during the period would include: the decline in 
the importance of the British Defence Departments; the growth of a 
manufacturing sector motivated by production-profit; and the rela-
tive influence of foreign capital markets and the returns from depo-
sits with bank and non-bank financial institutions. Consider these 
three items. 
The data indicate a fairly stable, or slightly rising, labour's 
share; this would appear conformable to the much-discussed stabi-
lity of labour's share in other economie s. However there exists the 
possibility of incongruency in the Malta case. Arguments could be 
forwarded to back hypothesis that in this period o·f transition, when 
corporate enterprise is extended, there should have been registered 
an observed increase in the share of factor capital though this 
would not necessarily imply an actual shift. We explain. 
It is noted, for example, that the wages and salaries of Maltese 
personnel employed with the U.K. Defence Department represented 
only one item in the expenditure of the Armed Forces in Malta. 
Whatever capital investment was undertaken at the expense of the 
British Government (say, the purchasipg and installation of radar 
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urutS or other equipment for the maintenance of the airport) is not 
accounted for in the Maltese GNP unless Maltese contractors are 
employed and the installation costS appear under wages or person-
al profit - if the contractor is not registered as a limited liability 
company. The Service Departments, as officially estimated, are 
100% labour intensive; the subsequent yield on capital invested is 
nil. 
As the British Government reduced Maltese personnel engaged 
with its Departments, the discharged employees had the choice of 
emigrating, of turning themselves into self-employed by setting-up 
small businesses of their own, or of retraining and re-employment 
in the other sectors of Industry and Tourism or in the Public Civil 
Service. Consequently, the hypothetical labour intensity for the 
Maltese economy as suggested in the National Accounts would de-
crease. For the private sector makes allowance for its capital and 
assume a rate of return. Capital starts being considered productive; 
its absolute returns become positive, and, therefore, its relative 
share should increase compared to its pre-industrialisation value. 
But such a rise should not imply a shift towards factor capital; ra-
ther, it would simply represent the persuit of proper accounting pro-
cedures where the non-labour factors are allocated their actual or 
imputed remuneration. 
Similarly, the output of Government Administration as officially 
recor<ded is also hundred per cent labour intensive. If Government 
stabilise the intake and level of recruitment of public employees, 
thus bringing about a relative decline in the public sector employ-
ment 'to a growing labour force, the overall relative labour-intensity 
would register an observed fall. The rate at which this partly appa-
rent drop in the aggregate labour/non-labour (L/K) ratio would de-
pend on several factors including the momentum of the industriali-
sation programme; the average L/K ratios in every sector reflecting 
the respective L/K intensity in separate units of industry or tour-
ism; the growth of the labour force resulting from changes in school-
leaving age, official retirement age, movement in female participa-
tion rates, and changes in the length of the working week. The 
share accruing to corporate capital, whether publicly or privately 
owned or of mixed ownership, would show the tendency to rise. How-
ever, in the cases refetred this movement towards an increment in 
capital's share is due to the omission of allocating a return to ca-
pital in the Malta Government and the British Defence Departments. 
The actual distribution, i.e. one combining a return to capital in 
these sectors could differ substantially from what the tabulated da-
ta suggest. Even within the manufacturing sector itself, if activity 
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proceeds as normally assumed, there exists an inherent element 
contributing towards an increase in the profit share. In the first 
years of production, a company could be expected to register nega-
tive profits; it aims to break even after two or three years of acti-
ty. So, while profits are nil, dividends would not be distributed and 
it would appear that labour is rewarded at the expense of capital. 
Once profits are registered the return going to capital becomes po-
sitive in turn and the composition of final output of a productive 
enterprise changes; labour's relative share would indicate a dec-
line. This case would represent another example in accounting 
techniques, although the cause for such a change in output-sharing 
is different from the one noted in connection with the Government 
and the U.K. Defence Departments. 
This type of shift in relative shares is important especially 
since under 'Manufacturing' is included the output of the Malta 
Drydocks. This industry operated beyond its earn ing pote ntial 
since 'commercialised' in 1959; its debts were financed by direct 
Public subsidies paid out of total Government revenue. Whenever 
the enterprise turns from a def~cit to a surplus, the relative compo-
sition of final output could be regarded as the normal distributive 
share in this unit. 
Intersectoral movements between the self-employed units and 
factory production in favour of the latter would also reveal a ten-
dency towards an increase in the income share going to profits; 
once again the observed shift would reflect, in part, the diffusion 
of proper accounting procedures. Self-employed and owners of small 
units employing, say, up to four persons, regard the difference bet-
ween total costs and total revenue as income in the sense of re-
muneration for their labour efforts. No attempts are made to distin-
guish between the 'transfer payment' and the 'pure profit' compo-
nents of the periodic inflow of the funds earned. 7 With the applica-
tion of proper accounting methods, the self-employed would impute 
a wage and salary for themselves based upon the value of their 
7This attitude could have changed with the introduction of Provisional 
Tax (under the P.A.Y.E. system of tax collecting) introduced in 1973. 
\J:'ith unincorporated business the residual between costs and rev~nue is 
considered as personal income for income tax purposes. But, apart from 
Income Tax considerations, the distinction between 'wage income' and 
'profits' could have a deeper significance than it appears to in so far as 
different types of con sumption expendit~~s could be re iated to different 
sources of funds, e.g. expenditure upon household durables corre lated to 
accumulated savings. . 
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services in the labour market, estimate the residual and find OUt 
the gross return on the funds invested in their. business. If the num-
ber of self-employed declines, labour moves into corporate enter-
prise where total output is allocated among the inputs utilised for 
production; under these conditions capital's share turns positive 
and, consequently, the apparent overall labour's share falls. It must 
be emphasized, however, that capital must be obtaining a return, 
small as it may be, in the one-man self-employed units; only it is 
not recognised as such by its earners. 
Other elements that could be considered to have led to an in-
crease in capital's share are the upward movement in interest 
rates in Malta and in London where Maltese were habitually invest-
ing their savings; and the opportunities in the real-estate market 
that contributed to the breaking up of the traditional rental ceiling. 
The Maltese individual has demonstrated in the period studied a 
relatively high marginal propensity to save, about twenty five per 
cent of incremental disposable income. So far, the main choices 
available for the small savers were: the retention of funds in idle 
cash balances at home; savings, and time deposits with Maltese or 
London banks; bonds issued by the British Government in England 
and since 1959 local stock by the Malta Government; and real es-
tate. High interest rates in recent years could have affected a 
transformation in psychological attitudes toward deposits with fi-
nancial institutions; idle cash was transferred into deposits, main-
ly time deposits, and into Defence or Development bonds where se-
curity is guaranteed. As the volume of savings deposited increas-
ed and as there occurred simultaneously an upward shift in the 
structure of rates paid, the annual absolute return in the fonn of in-
terest earnings rose. 
In addition the social conception of the share of housing expen-
diture in the household's budget is being gradually modified as an 
effect of a more diffused awareness of costs and of rising stan-
dards. The rental issue is highly complex; it involves social and 
legal considerations in addition to those of a purely economic na-
ture. What is outstanding over the last five years reviewed is the 
fact that the rentals currently demanded and paid are higher than 
they were, say, a decade ago; which signifies an increase in the 
absolute volume of funds earned from house renting. 
The above influences were certainly observed over the period 
discussed. Their effects have been either negligible or counteract-
ed by comparable radical changes in labour incomes or, still, never 
recorded properly in the National Account Statistics. The third con-
sideration would demand a study for a new approach to meet the 
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transformed sodo-economic conditions in Malta; but che first two 
factors could be "elaborated further. 
There did occur a radical shift in wages and salaries in the Go-
vernment sector, following the report of the Wage and Salaries 
Anomalies Commission in 1969, backdating payments to 1966; 
wage increases on a minor scale spread to the remaining commer-
cial sectors of the economy through higher expenditure on consum-
er durables, for example. Such an income rise could have offset 
the expansion of factory work and service units. Or, it could have 
happened that since the effects of the British Services run-down 
fell, in part, upon men nearing legal retirement age, which was lo-
wered from 65 to 61, wage or salaries earners with the Services re-
tired and did not form part of the emerging enterprises where labour 
and capital factors were allotted their share. Still, those who be-
came unemployed could have either emigrated, or got themselves 
employed at rates which were comparatively lower than the remu-
neration with the British Defence Departments; the increase in men 
employed compensate for the relatively lower financial rewards per 
head. 
The Underdec!aration of personal incomes; the proper distribution 
between wage income, actual or imputed, and residual or profits in 
every unit; and the knowledge that actual income per head, as ref-
lected in the domestic standard of living, is greater than the one 
imputed fror.c. National Accounts; these point to one direction: they 
question the adequacy of the National Accounts data. If the under-
estimation turn out to be great, one could challenge the usefulnes s 
of the present statistics where these are to be compared to those 
obtained in the future. 
Finally, a remark about the share of undistributed company pro-
fits (Table 2), which steadily increased. It is assumed that like 
dividend and profit shares, this item is governed mainly by general 
business conditions, but undistributed profits tend to fluctuate 
more than the distributed because companies seem to prefer to 
maintain their dividend distributions as stable as possible. In the 
Malta case, this share kept on rising; this could be interpreted as 
a sign of buoyant activity in several markets. But such an inter-
pretation could be misleading; it is estimated that the marginal 
prope~sity to save by Maltese firms is low. 8 This partly reflects 
the fact that there arises an inducement to distribute rather than 
retain corporate profits in the existing provisions for tax-free holi-
days. The increasing relative share and the relatively low corporate 
8 Waldorf, W.H. 'An Econometric model of the Malte se Is lands (Office of 
the Prime Minister 1969) p. 17-18. 
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propensity to save at the margin, however, could be integrated once 
it is realised that over the last decade reviewed there occurred an 
increase in the number of corporate manufacturing and tourist units 
whose aggregate savings rose relativewise to the GNP. If Wal-
. dod's estimates are accepted, it becomes a matter for speculation 
what the behaviour of such an item would be when the tax conces-
sionary period expires or if industry is wholly or partly nationalis-
ed through the direct participation of the para-statal Malta Deve-
lopment Corporation. 
The above comments apply to the past; policy considerations 
however, look ahead. An attempt is therefore essential to detect 
factors that would help comprehend a changing society and th.at 
would assist in the achievement of economic policy targets. Pro-
fit Motives and Entrepreneurial mentality are analysed in the next 
s~ction while putting forward a case for a sha~e policy. 
THE PRODUCTION-PROFIT MOTIVE IN THE MALTESE ECONOMY NEED 
FOR A SHARES POLICY? 
It is analytically helpful to distinguish between two types of 
profit: Commercial profit and Production Profit. Such a profit di-
chotomy identifies the source of profits and thereby suggests en-
trepreneurial aspirations and probable reactions to different policy 
measures. 
Commercial profit in the wholesale and retail business is based 
primarily on commissions in the form of a percentage mark-up. It 
depends, therefore, upon the value of period turnover for its deter-
mination. In Malta, this profit is a result of the local consumers' 
demand for foreign produced goods and services and, consequently, 
is mirrored in the volume and composition of imports. 
Production profit arises from the manufacturing of goods and 
from the provision of services which are directed either towards 
the domestic market to substitute imported commodities or to sup-
ply foreign demand. This type of profit is consequently affected by 
the import costs of raw materials and transport, and the export of 
the finished product. 
The wholesale-retail profit relies upon the internal competition 
among importers and retailers and could be influenced by the avail-
ability of funds of a person or a company; such facilities would be 
reflective of the credit span obtained from the foreign supplier and 
forwarded to the local distributive outlets. The production profit, 
on the other hand, depends upon world market conditions in factor 
costS and product prices, upon marketing knowhow at the pre- and 
post-production stages, on shipping and air schedules, as well as 
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upon the. quality of manufactured goods and delivery time. (This 
comment does not entirely apply for the sector of Tourism which, 
being service providing, demands consumption on the spot). The 
'importer's profit' arises, like tourism's, out of the rendering of a 
service, in the tertiary sector; the production profit emanates from 
the secondary economic sectors. 
Gross Trading Profits increased from an estimated £..\18.3 million 
in 1954 to £M27.6 million in 1973; though, the gradual absolute 
rise in value does not mean an increase relativewise. Averaged 
over five-year periods, Gross Trading Profits declined by 2.5 per-
centiles (Vid. Table 1). The production profit in the Maltese eco-
nomy in the past is conspicuous by its absence. It could be argued, 
in general terms, that the profit motive as ordinarily understood and 
implemented in economic theory has been non-existent in the Mal-
tese economy. An impression of the comparative importance of 
profit-motivated behaviour in the Maltese economic set-up could be 
formed by classifying the various sectors according to the presence 
or absence of considerations about the yields on capital invested; 
importance is judged by the relative labour content of every pro-
ductive category. 
PROFIT MOTIVATION AND ECONOMIC SECTORS IN MALTA 1954 - 1973 
(% OF LABOUR FORCE) 
1954 1973 
1. Profit Motive: Nil 
18.34 (a) Public Administration 16.9 
Defence Departments 26.8 4.54 
H. Profit Motive: Indefinite 
Agriculture and Fishing 10.54 6.28 
Certain units in retail, 
construction and private 
services 
Government Enterprises 
Ill. Profit Motive: Dominant 
Manufacturing and the Malta 
Drydocks 10.69 28.56 (b) 
Hotels and Restaurants ) 
7.59 10.38 Insurance, Banking & Real Estate) 
Wholesale and Retailinj;! 13.01 11.08 
(a) excluding Malta Pioneer Corps (which amounted to 4.01% of To-
tal Labour Force) 
(b) including Personal Services. 
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The profit motive is absent in the sectors of Public Administra-
tion and the U.K. Defence Departments which, between them, ac-
counted for 43.7% of employment in 1954 and 32.88% in 1973. This 
implies that the upward shifts in wage and salary structures would 
not affect the level of employment or the working conditions in 
these sectors: demand for labour is relatively wage inelastic with-
in remuneration changes normally experienced. The market price 
mechanism for the services sold tends to be blunted by non-econo-
mic considerations. 
To these two sectors could be added the Malta Drydocks, former-
ly under the British Admiralty, but in the sixties converted into a 
commercial ship-repair yard and since 1969 the responsibility of 
the Malta Government. When work was commissioned by the British 
Navy, the accent of production was not so much upon the turnover 
rate as upon the quality of work. Under the altered conditions, 
quality and time determine, to a great extent, the volume of con-
tracts. Up to 1973 this sector was operating at a loss. So although 
the profit-motive prevails it is a goal that has yet to be realised. 
It appears appropriate for the period reviewed to consider this in-
dustry with the two sectors in the first category. This would mean 
that the employment data for 'Manufacturing' for 1973 need to be 
adjusted accordingly, reduced by 4%. 
Profit in the second category is termed 'Indefinite' because 
there are strong reasons for doubting the true interpretation given 
to, and the connotation such a concept conveys, in the sectors in-
dicated. It is observed, for example, that in the Agricultural Sector 
farmers do not distinguish between the components forming the re-
sidual resulting from the excess of recei pts over costs. With a ris-
ing generation of farmers introducing, among other things, the cor-
rect accounting methods, a change in attitudes towards capital in-
vested could be expected to occur. The resultant modified views 
should benefit not solely the persons involved but also the econo-
my in general. Prices would attain their role in the economic sys-
tem; they would start passing clear messages to producers; re-
sources could be better allocated if ideas about social provisions 
were to change. 
For similar reasons, Government Enterprises were included un-
der the second category; for such services as pasteurised milk 
could be administered upon profitable lines or, at least, managed 
with the objective of reducing to a minimum the subsidy per unit 
(per pint bottle of mi lk). 
Profit appears as the determining factor in the institution and 
the running of a project and in the employment opportunities and 
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the security attached within the sectors classified under the third 
category. At the present stage of development these are the sec-
tors that demand careful manipulation and that could generate so-
cial friction. These sectors stand in sharp contrast to the rest; 
the remarks that follow are primarily directed to them. 
Within the third category, the profit motive is dualistic. Though 
conceptually it could be defined homogeneously, yet its sources 
are distinctly different and policies could be persued to bear direct 
effect on one but not on the other. Still, since the Maltese commu-
nity is numerically relatively small, and considering that the Mal-
tese importer or wholesaler of a certain commercial stature would 
exert direct influence upon industry and the real estate or tourist 
business, it could happen that pessimistic psychological inclina-
tions, the results of adverse running of affairs in the im port trade, 
for example, could spread and restrict the momentum of activity in 
the other sectors. This would not represent the case of the 'aver-
age opinion' among industrialists of what their prevailing 'average 
opinion' about the future in industry and commerce is likely to be. 
Rather, it would be the impression and attitude of an influential, 
committed individual the repercussions of whose plans are rapidly 
diffused and extended over various economic sectors. To avoid ad-
verse and unwanted effects, it becomes essential to clarify the 
aims and the implementation procedures of whatever public policies 
are per sued. 9 
For planning purposes, shares policy, whether declared explicit-
ly or implied, becomes essential in regulating the movement in the 
shares accruing to productive units in the industrial and tourist 
sectors, predominantly, and in the GNP in general. Ideally, within 
a mixed economy, the phases of procedure should be worked out by 
9 It is useful to distinguish between goals and principles of economic po-
licies. The principles determine actions of economic policy, but they are 
general in scope and mainly qualitative in character. They can be under-
stood as including rules and prescriptions for the shaping of economic 
life, and in particular the economic order, such as can be found especial-
ly in constitutions, laws and also governmental programmes. 
Economic policy goals, on the other hand, are defined in a way as to 
be generally quan tifiable. They are taken to mean variables, changes in 
variables and relationships between variables which relate to matters re-
levant to the economy as a whole, e.g. the general price level or the size 
of the GNP. They can be expressed in a cardinal form, e.g. a real growth 
rate of 5%, or can be set in ordinal form, e.g .• a higher degree of involve-
ment in foreign trade. Those economic policy goals which can be expres-
sed in the ordinal form only, lead over to the princ iple s of economic poli-
cy. 
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a constituent body representing the Government, the Labour Move-
ments and the Business Communities; the goal being the channel-
ing of resources where they could be most productive and in ways 
that would cause the minimum hardship on the sides involved. The 
restructuring of the economy is currently accorded priority by Pub-
lic Authorities in Malta; stimulating production along set patterns 
demands the knowledge of both the benefits and the costs that 
could be expected to be associated with different programmes. 
This task is never easily tackled anywhere; it could prove harder 
still in a country that lacks experience in production planning and 
in executing schemes directed towards foreign markets in purchas-
ing materials and selling finished goods. 
The absolute values of earnings could be established, within li-
mits, through appropriate legislation determining the financial re-
muneration for the identified economic sectors, the length of the 
working week, the rates of benefit payments, and pri vate or social 
insurance contributions. Capital's share, then, depends upon the 
measures that influence the structures of interest rates, rents and 
profit. Return in the form of interest is affected by controls over 
the range of rates stipulated; by the encouragement, or otherwise, 
of bank cartellisation; and by exchange controls to shield the local 
market for funds and securities from foreign competition. The rent-
al structure follows from policies regulating controlled or decon-
trolled residential housing; subsidised public housing programmes; 
the stimulus to mortgage securities and the introduction of mort-
gage guarantees or insurance. Rent legislation is tied closely to a 
set of politically visualized social standards; so policies aimed at 
interest rate structure (influencing the cost of borrowing funds) and 
labour wages should contribute towards the degree of success 
achieved, or to the outright failure of, rent laws' implementation. 
Profits are directly affected by tax-incentive schemes and depre-
ciation procedures adopted; but they represent the final outcome 
of a series of forces, namely, education programmes reflected in 
the quality of labour and of management, local credit facilities and 
export credit guarantees, a reliable transport network to and from 
Malta, and harbour and airport management. 
Production profit, pre-tax, in a firm is determined by the exce ss 
of total revenue over total costs. The latter consist of labour 
costs; material costs plus other expenditures contracted for the 
accounting period, including rent, physical asset depreciation (in-
dependent of the way estimation is arrived at or whether adequate 
provision is made), and marketing-costs including transport. Re-
venue is the outcome of the volume of sales and prices. The wage 
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structure 10 the manufacturing units, originally devised to encou-
rage investment by widening up the gap favourably to corporate 
savings, was set up on the absence of a tradition in relatively 
large factory manufacturing processes. It would therefore be en-
lightening for policy-making to obtain information about the unit 
costs and market conditions in the various sectors before plans re-
gulating a sector's nominal or re al functional share for a period 
could be drawn. 
Sacrificing corporate savings a~ this stage would be detrimental 
to future growth. On the other hand, sacrificing labour could be so-
cially disruptive, economically harmful, and, surely, politically un-
acceptable. The Maltese economy seeks the ability and willingness 
of investors, local and foreign, private and governmental, to provide 
jobs in sufficient number to absorb the envisaged labour supply. 
Funds are important; but knowhow assumes a crucial character and, 
unless it is forthcoming, the ability to raise funds may turn out to 
be sterile vis-a-vis the employment objective. 
Cooperation from the private sector, local or foreign, cannot be 
reduced to secondary importance. For unless foreign governments 
are prepared to supply temporarily managerial skills, in addition to 
financial, the Malta Government, aiming at profit-making in the 
industries it controls, would require collaboration from non-Govern-
mental sources until the time a class of local managers is formed. 
A shares policy, then, should be worked out determining the re-
lative shares of labour and capital in industry and tourism based 
upon feasible proj ections of growth in every commodity market, ac-
count being taken of the overall expansion of the aggregate acti vi-
ty. Such a policy expects the formation of a realistic attitude to-
wards social cooperation founded upon comprehension of the eco-
nomic needs and the particular problems which the size, natural 
resources and the social intermixture of Malta gi ve rise to. A shares 
policy could produce the desired results if it succeeds in minimis-
ing friction that usually manifests itself in the form of social un-
rest. 10 
10 A shares policy could be drawn up in real and/or nominal terms. One 
example of the application of such a policy is offered by the wages poli-







Increase with productivity 
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WAGES AS SHARE IN GNP 
Decline 
Constant 
Movement depended on market 
influences. e.g. if wages rise 
Shared understanding and cooperation among Government, Trade 
Unions and Business are not obtained effortlessly anywhere; Malta 
is no exception. Industrial labour in Malt~ is led by a strong union; 
unless this organisation is prepared to coordinate its strategy with 
that of the Public Authorities and Business by temporarily sacri-
ficing certain claims for better work conditions and pay, the setting 
up of a tri-partite council entrusted with the regulation of shares 
would be of no avail. Defining incomes may effectively turn out to 
mean solely wages and salaries, for these constitute the cost com-
ponents over which local control is feasible; manufacturing profits, 
being a residual, are controlled in part by international market con-
ditions for raw materials, product prices and transport and no 'Na-
tional Council', or a similar body, in Malta could ever realistically 
hope to influencing these forces. Labour, apparently would have to 
bear the brunt at this transformation stage. 
Besides, labour movements are currently bent upon the idea of 
workers' participation in Industry and tourism. Ideal and deserving 
encouragement as this goal may be, careful discriminate implemen-
tation alone could make it function adequately. If introduced hasti-
ly and unconditionally, it could create unforeseen consequences 
including the loss of trade union control over its members. How-
ever, if applied selectively and opportunely it would develop an at-
mosphere of mutual understanding and participation between the 
parties involved, and help reduce, if not eliminate completely, fu-
ture social-industrial unre~t. 
Restraint and foresight assume critical importance in the export 
industries where international market forces set the rules. This 
suggests that whereas wages could move independently o.f their re-
lated labour's productivity in a substantial component of the eco-
nomy, certain sectoral wage movements would rely exclusively up-
on the type of industry and the business conditions subject to fluc-
tuations over time. This dual gauge for wage increase could lead to 
in excess of productivity and 
prices remain constant:share 
of wages would incre ase. 
The Netherlands moved from a policy of virtually direct controls to pro-
gressIvely less restriction. There is reason to believe that the policy aid-
ed that nation to achieve a stable reconstruction without seriously ero-d-
ing its international competitive position. As the recovery proceeded the 
vital cooperation between economic sectors began to diminish, and the 
Government's ability to rely on volontary restraint dissipated. 
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a decline in deference ll among the local working classes. An ag-
gressive attitude would tend to accentuate itself for two main rea-
sons. First, wages in the profit-motivated enterprises have been 
comparatively low to those in the other sectors (in terms of both 
financial and non-financial remunerations); the discrepancy could 
be reduced following the imposition of a national minimum wage 
applicable to male and female employees effective for all from Ap-
ril 1976. Secondly, the diversification of education facilities has 
led to the apparent saturation of those posts formerly reserved for 
young people with secondary and tertiary education and thus com-
pelled young men and women with equivalent academic or technical 
qualifications to seek employment in" activities deemed, in the not 
distant past, reserved for unskilled or semi-skilled workers whose 
education training did not exceed the primary school level. It is 
difficult for a young man or woman entering the labour market to 
understand the logic behind income differentials merely in terms of 
time and demand conditions. Data for the past years indicate the 
gap among the average sectoral earnings in three main groups, 




AVERAGE WAGE/SALARY (£M) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 
Government and Public 499 639 767 774 
Utilities 
Defence Establishments 626 694 900 1016 




715 * 705* 
1025 1263 
557 594 
RELATIVITY BETWEEN AVERAGE WAGE/SALARY 1968, 1973 
(Private Sector = 100) 
1968 1973 
Government and Public Utilities 141. 76 142.26 * , 
118.69+ I 
Defence Establishment 177.84 
___ J~~:~~ I Private Sector 100.00 
* including Malta Pioneer Corps Members. (1495 men in 1972; 4322 in 1973). 
+excluding Malta Pioneer Corps Members. 
llThe concept of 'deference' was introduced by political scientists to ac-
count for the apparently curious phenomenon that a good proportion of 
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With the gradual disappearance of the Defence Establishment a 
head-on clash could arise between the workers in the Government 
and Public utilities, including the Malta Drydocks, and the labour 
forces in the industrial and tourist sectors. The rising generation 
of Maltese consumers dependent at this phase in life solely on 
wage or salary as the source of income could expect living stan-
'dards tliat may not be compatible with the earnings from activity in 
a profit-motivated enterprise.- Whereas employees within the Go-
vernment or Defence Establishment could eventually exert the ne-
cessary pressure to improve their salary scales, similar efforts by 
workers in the private sector could possibly lead to their unem-
ployment. Government Authorities, with an eye on the inflow of fo-
reign capital participating in development, have continually ad-
vertised the relatively abundant labour available with the result 
that wages in the developing new sectors, especially those for fe-
male workers, could possibly have been pegged over the period at 
an unnecessarily low level. 
In a market-oriented economy, an individual's view of oneself 
depends on success; trus leads to investment for one's career. A 
remuneration-differential enters the expectations of young people. 
Therefore, the facilities provided by the State in education require 
intelligent distribution within a small economy. Otherwise over-
supply of specialised labour would retain the sectoral wages and 
salaries at socially unacceptable low levels. Qualified worker par-
ticipation, though, in production and profits, say, in the form of 
bonus correlated to preceding year's profits could partly counter-
balance this factor. 
The success of a share distribution policy depends upon this 
mechanism based on restraint in rapid upward shifts in consump-
tion patterns to enable the formation of an industrial sector suffi-
ciently sound to repay the workers for the deprivation endured at a 
point in time. Workers would be investing in wage restraint hoping 
to be compensated at a compound rate at a future date. The time 
horizon and the rate of return would be the issue which, after de-
tailed statistical information and several projections, one could at-
tempt to determine. Relative share participation could be computed 
working class voted for a Party which did not represent their interest. 
The explanation given is that these workers hold deferential attitudes, ie. 
they feel they are inferior to well-educated middle class people: that it is 
the business of such people to govern society; and therefore they ought to 
vote for them as their natural leaders. Applied to the economic field, the 
effect of a decli'ne in deference means that workers are less and less pre-
pared to accept that they should be paid less than 'middle-class' people. 
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upon different basic assumptions regarding commodity and labour 
prices together with probable social change. 
A shares policy is inherently dynamic; economic growth consi-
derations, therefore, cannot be abstained from if a flexible plan is 
to be drawn as a policy guide. A synoptic exposition of the present 
inconclusive theory delineating the relationship between growth 
and distribution is useful not only for what it suggest but also for 
what it does not suggest. The next section introduces the main fea-
tures of one theory of this complex issue and proceeds to infer in-
dications for policy' formulation. 
, GROWTH AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN ECONOMIC THEORY: A 
GUIDE TO POLICY MAKING. 
There is no universal agreement'about the possibility of formula-
ting a general theory of economic growth; di fferences in socio-poli-
cal conditions render every growth process specific. It is harder 
still to incorporate the distributional effects of different growth 
processes upon different income groups.12 However, economic 
growth is commonly explained by these factors: abundant resourc-
es, with high elasticity of labour supply to start with; capital ac-
cumulation; more efficient allocation of resources i.e. the transfor-
mation of the producti ve structure and the redistribution of resourc-
es among the different sectors; economies of scale; and qualitative 
improvement of resources (the application of new or higher techno-
logies with respect to natural resources, and education in the use 
of human resources). 
The effective economic growth rate'depends upon the rapidity 
with which the socio-economic system transforms itself. This 
transformation rate is supposedly at a maximum level in an 'inter-
mediate' phase of the growth process when both the elasticity of 
the labour supply and exceptional opportunities for the realloc ation 
of resources and economies of scale are found together. The flex-
ibility of an economic system may become accentuated by charac-
teristics of the investment process and technical progress during 
this phase which can lead to continuous transfers of resources from 
low productivity sectors to those with a high level of producti vity. 
Unfortunately, growth theory, in spite of the complex models 13 in 
12Vid. Chenery et al: 'Redistribution with Growth' (Oxford University 
Press 1974). 
13It must be pointed out that a model does not constitute a theory. The 
latter is concerned with providing reasons for activity: it is interested in 
causes. A model, on the ocher hand, traces che effects of a given change 
upon a set of variables. It accepts a cause as a datum. 
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which it is expounded, and in spite of its practical motivations, 
has become concerned with rather esoteric issues. Its link with 
public policy is often very remote. Accordingly, it would be highly 
misleading to draw any theoretical conclusions relevant for policy 
considerations from the models presented. 14 Despite these limita-
tions, reference is here made to the neo-Keynesian model of distri-
bution to derive the implications that it could be interpreted to 
suggest. Kaldor's model, 15 departing from the basic assumption 
that Investment is a variable behaving independently of an econo-
my's saving, would suggest that to achieve a positive growth 
rate, the distribution of factor income would have to be shifted in 
favour of capital (non-labour factor). The argument can be briefly 
stated as follows: the profit (capital's) share could be shown to 
depend upon the investment share in aggregate output; with posi-
tive growth rate, if the investment share increases, the profit 
share would have to increase to bring about the Saving-Investment 
equality and attain equilibrium. Besides, emphasis in other models 
based upon Keynesian thinking elucidate the existence of a two-
way relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of invest-
ment, such that the latter will be the major determinant of the form-
er but the former, through expectations, would affect the value the 
latter obtains. 
Kaldor's model is developed in terms of a closed economy. If fo-
reign trade is accounted for, as it should be if concrete policy im-
plications are to be derived, the model could become worthless as 
soon as exports play a major part in the economy;16 if we assume in 
addition a high price elasticity of both imports and exports, the 
close relation between aggregate demand - prices - profits would 
no longer automatically hold. 
Moreover, investment raises income but it increases productive 
capacity as well. The distribution of income could change in the 
short run, favouring non-Iabou~' factors, but there exists also the 
potentiality of a higher output. The increased output could be dis-
tributed according to a Kaldorian mechanism i.e. in terms of saving 
propensities. Yet the outcome would be uncertain if capital is not 
considered a limitational factor and the wage bill increases as a 
response to an increase in the demand for labour. Once again, the 
14Yid. Eltis W.A., 'Growth and Distribution' (Macmillan 1973) ch. 14. 
15Kaldor, N. 'Alternative theories of Distribution' (Review of Economic 
Studies 1955) and Kregel J. op. cit Ch. ~ 
16Yid. Falise M. 'The Distribution of National Income in Belgium 1953-
62' in Marchal/Ducros ed. op. cit pp. 149-170. 
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consequences for the distribution under such conditions cannot be 
analysed within the framework of the widow's cruise theory. In-
vestment would not be solely a function of profit and capacity but 
also of another factor, say, the firm's struggle for domination in a 
particular market. 
Of course, it is very difficult to elicit practical specific conclu-
sions for the Maltese economy from such general observations. The 
local economy is both outward looking and growing; diversification 
of production units and of the ownership of productive assets, so 
important from the above model's point of view, are objectives cur-
rently actively persued by the Malta Government. Besides, although 
preferential treatment is given to capital investment and profits as-
suming implicitly a 'standard' propensity to invest, one can dis-
tinguish, at least, five marginal propensies to save, namely of la-
bour, of the domestic entrepreneur,' of the foreign private investor, 
of a foreign government as an investor in Malta, and of the Malta 
Government. These could range from 0.25 for labour to nil for the 
Malta Government. Hence the two-owner model would fail to indi-
cate a solution for a five-factor situation where behavioural reac-
tions are certainly different. But, assume, that in principle there 
potentially exists an 'equilibrium' solution and that whatever solu-
tion evolves it is socially acceptable. 
For policy purposes, considerations should focus upon the volume 
of capital required to stimulate growth from local and foreign 
sources, and the trend in wage rates over a period starting from a 
basic low initial level to the potentially highest over a given time 
horizon. Local wage-bill increases could mean either a resulting 
rise in exported commodity prices and a possible loss of a foreign 
market; or a reduction in profits; or, under the pressure of infla-
tionary situation in the economy where commodities are sold, no 
effect whatsoever on factors' shares within the unit of production 
in Malta. 
The relevant approaches to encourage private capital to move in-
to Malta together with the probabilities of applying the funds thus 
attracted are insisted upon in Government economic plans. Yet a 
misguiding attitude is often implied regarding investment exclusive-
ly as an income-propagating force. Apart from the relatively high 
leakage element that reduces considerably the short-run multiplier 
effect within the Maltese economy of a unit of autonomous invest-
ment, (the lags being unknown), investment outlays, as already ob-
served, add to the productive capacity as well. The infrastructural 
pattern relevant to assist or directly produce output once construct-
ed would influence activity for a long time. Increased effective de-
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mand, mainly achieved through exports of goods and services for 
consumption, has to meet the demands of the profit-oriented newly-
instituted production units (factories and hotels). The preoccupa-
tion with unemployed labour, regarded a national concern, could de-
tract attention from the considerations that should be given to idle 
technical capital or idle liquid funds generally thought of as being 
the responsibility of private industrial concerns or of the banks. 
Apart from the fact that the Public sector is gradually extending 
its control over a wider area of economic activity, and, as a con-
sequence, the national interest could, in time, directly assimilate 
itself with the interests of many productive units; the small size 
of the Maltese economy, and the commercial-industrial capital-ow-
nership considerations introduced in the previous section, do not 
permit such a dichotomy in social attitudes. Fixed capital needs 
to be fully active as much as labour, and liquid savings should be 
provided with the potential for outlets where "they could be profit-
ably absorbed. 
In addition, the physical size of the Island discourages theset-
ting up of very large manufacturing concerns whose commodities 
are subjected" to regular demand fluctuations abroad. If scale eco-
nomies and the realisation of ancillary industries could be profit-
ably envisaged, the type of enterprise relevant need to be carefully 
selected. The hope for future expansion following entries into new 
markets should be given priority ilf feasibility studies. However, 
caution should also be demonstrated in not relying heavily upon 
single, comparatively 'giant' enterprises. The Maltese economy 
probably would not be sufficiently resilient to absorb a fairly large 
number of workers once the development momentum declines, un-
less a coincidental rise in aggregate activity could temporarily as-
sist in damping down the undesirable effects of sectoral unemploy-
ment. This point will be discussed further in a subsequent section. 
Idle capacity, unless judged of a transitory character, would dis-
courage scarce, quick-profit seeking foreign capital and the essen-
tial expertise that it carries with it. The problem facing economic 
planners could therefore be briefly stated as the constant search 
for the type of product (or products) that could not only compete on 
the world markets but that could also generate confidence in non-
related enterprises and act as an 'emulating guide' to their mana-
gers. 
Now, given the product prices, the costs of raw materials, capi-
tal equipment and transport, it follows that, within a unit, wages' 
and capital's shares are determined by the degree of capital inten-
sity. Given this capital/labour (and capital/output) ratio an in-
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crease in non-labour's share implies a decline in that of wages; or 
stated differently, a rise in product prices not complemented by in-
crements in costs, could be reaped entirely in the form of profit. 
If: TT == profits per unit (a residual) 
P == price per unit 
C n == cost per unit other than labour's 
C w == wages and salaries 
Then TT = P - (C n +C w ) 
Given P and C n, changes in C w affects TT; if TT is to rise then C w 
must be set at a level sufficiently low (thus establishing the sta-
tic upper limit of wages) in order to obtain the desirable profit per 
unit. If production units do not allow flexibility between different 
capital/labour relations, and account is taken of the basic fact 
that non-labour costs and product prices are determined under in-
ternational market dispositions, wages might have to be kept unex-
pectedly low to attract foreign pri vate capital in Malta. This state 
of affairs could be socially acceptable for a few years, but it is 
bound to be reflected in the supply of labour offering its services, 
as will be discussed in the next sections, and could create labour 
unrest rendering a Shares Policy impracticable. 
The tertiary or service sectors could perhaps be encouraged to 
a greater extent than at first would appear desirable. In these sec-
tors, where adaptation would be relatively costly and uncertain, 
the. notion of the Capital/labour relationship affecting shares tends 
to lose its lucidity. Fixed investment in tertiary units may bear no 
close relationship to the working capital necessary for the provi-
sion of a service; still the investment funds spent on construction 
would offer the sole scope for the ancillary developments that fol-
low. For example, a dock or a first-class hotel. The heavy invest-
ment outlay expended in the carving up of a dock would be a re-
source waste unless the location is utilised for the specific pur-
pose for which it was constructed; and, at the same time, those 
funds could hardly be included in estimating the Capital/labour ra-
tio in the ship-building/repair industry. Even though it is felt that 
its inclusion is justified, it is only with hesitation that the result 
is compared with technological changes as normally understood, 
when comparisons between techniques in production are made. 
Once it becomes difficult to allocate the relevant capital actual-
ly contributing to the production and sales of a service, it follows 
that it turns out harder still determining the share going to the 
said factor. Deliberate shifts in share movements could, conse-
quently, be determined only within projected limits. 
Foreign investment implies repatriation of profits; fund outflow 
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depends partly upon reinvestment in expansionary projects and 
partly on tax schedules. Mr. Waldorf estimates a 'marginal propensi-
ty to repatriate profits' equal to .41; besides his equation indicates 
that the importance of profits due abroad relative to total profits 
tends to grow unless there are changes in assets ownership in the 
future. 
The pursuit of the Incentive package programme in the form of 
grants, non-interest bearing loans, tax concessions or generous 
depreciation terms, allied to the growth of export market by the 
manufacturing industries would not only tend to increase the profit 
share in this sector but also represent a permanent benefit. 17 The 
package mix of financial aid and concessionary terms has to be 
drawn up in a way that would stimulate investment but not at a 
permanent 'cost' to labour. The policy of raising company tax rate 
and granting a tax-concession period for specified investments has 
the double effect of enabling the firm to recoup quicker the original 
capital, i.e. it shortens the payback period, assuming sales of 
goods occur, while permitting the Public Treasury to collect more 
revenue than otherwise if profits are realised after the tax holiday 
period elapses. 
If foreign capital from private sources is not forthcoming pri vate 
enterprise would have to represent the share of non-public owner-
ship of productive units. This could be crucial to the determination 
of the scope and the role of productive factors predominantly in 
terms of the Person-State relationships. So long as corporate pri-
vate enterprise prevails, one could talk of different ownerships and 
conjecture various social groups. If socialisation of the national 
product occurs, the problem of allocating the respective shares 
would remain, but within a modified State-Individual relationship 
the friction that would be expected to arise between the shares ac-
cruing to 'profits' and those going to wages, would either tend to 
be subdued completely or assume a greater dimension in the form 
of passive resistance. Social ownership would justify attitudes 
that under a differeqt socio-political framework would be regarded 
intolerable. The withdrawal or outright exclusion of private capital 
17 It is sometimes held that the treatment of depreciation in the tax legis-
lation only influences the distribution of income over time. Disregarding 
the effects of progressive taxation, a liberal policy is often claimed to 
mean a short-term gain for profits (net of taxes), but when the capital has 
been fully depreciated while it still generates income the punishment is 
inevitable. This may be correct under stationary conditions; assuming 
growth, however, the gain becomes permanent. 
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sources could create problems in terms of managerial skills. Ma-
nagement not only influences sectoral transformations, but also de-
termines the long-term rate of economic growth, imposes the limit 
of sectoral maximum absolute output level and the composition of 
the GNP and, as a result, influences functional share allocation. 
Economic theory seems to imply that there has to be a real, ob-
served shift towards the share of non-labour factors, mainly in the 
form of profits from production and tourism. Pragmatism, however, 
has to rule decision making; dynamic projections based upon dif-
ferent hypothetically, changing socio-economic conditions, rather 
than short-run considerations, would provide the measure against 
which projects are assessed. The economy should be enabled to di-
versify its resources in such a way as to generate opportunities in 
the future for reinvestment parallel to the demands of technology 
and the markets served. 
Assuming mixed-enterprises, decisions about .industrial projects 
feasibility, incentive schemes, and, also wage structures, could be 
reached after evaluating the following factors: 
(i) the economic feasibility of setting up an enterprise in Mal-
ta; 
(ii) the strucrural balance between manufacturing and the other 
sectors (primary and tertiary) as the U.K. Defence Department is 
tapered out; 
(iii) the wage ranges estimated acceptable and profit-yielding un-
der changing market conditions; 
(iv) the ability of the Malta Government to enter into joint ow-
nership with private foreign companies; they supply expertise in 
production and marketing in addition to funds for investment; 
(v) the success of the Malta Government to raise funds from fo-
reign Government sources and invest them in industry on their own 
or on inter-Government joint-ventures; there would still arise the 
need for the managerial personnel to run business with succes s; 
(vi) the behaviour of the labour unions vis-a-vis workers' coope-
ration and participation in a production unit. Labour movements in 
corporate sectors could participate from profits (as distinct from 
share ownership) by obtaining a percentage share of annual profits 
which funds would be allocated for the benefits of union members, 
say for the setting up of pension funds or social benefit schemes. 
(Note that the employees in the tourist industry are in a different 
situation from those in the manufacturing enterprises; schemes in 
these units do not reflect the pay packet of the workers. Wages, 
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denoting the functional share of labour in the firm's books, are 
augmented by tips. To a certain extent the increment in the form of 
tips could be regarded as a function of the class of hotel or res-
taurant, the income bracket of the tourists, and of the activity level 
within a set period. There is implied, indirectly, a relationship 
between the original investment in fixed capital - the hotel or res-
taurant - and the tippage value.) 
(vii) the social aspirations, the result of investment in human 
beings, that have to be met if the timely supply of specialised and 
general labour is to be forthcoming. This aspect is discussed in 
the following section. 
The result of the several forces bearing upon a scheduled distri-
bution sharing of the GNP could be that, despite its recently ac-
quired political independence, Malta would still have to preserve, 
in an altered form, its traditional characteristic of a 'region' form-
ing part of a vast complex. Past statistics for functional income 
shares indicate that factor capital was not adequately accounted 
for. The Maltese GNP was mainly based upon wages and salaries 
subsidized from imported funds not aiming to earn a profit. Such a 
situation could be partly extended, in the form of income from ro-
yalties from oil production just as at the moment it is assisted 
through the renting of defence facilities to Britain and its N .A. T .0. 
allies. 
LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITY AND FUNCTIONAL $HARES 
This section considers a hypothesis that, the functional distri-
bution of income is affected not only by the market structure but al-
so by the elasticity of supply and demand for labour irrespective 
of the market form. E. Preiser18 concludes that the greater the elas-
ticity of the labour supply schedule, reflecting the preferences of 
the working force in terms of work and remuneration rates deriving 
support from capital ownership, the lower is the share going to non-
labour factors. 
The greater the supply elasticity of labour the lower would be 
the level of employment and the higher the wage rate, given the la-
bour demand schedule (based upon technical properties, product 
prices and market structures, and costs). Employment is lower not 
18Preiser E. 'Property and Power in the Theory of Distribution' (Interna-
tional Economic Papers - 2. 1952) Preiser implements a static two factor> 
model: labour and land where the latt~r term stands for all the material 
factors of production, i.e. what in this paper is defined as 'capital'. 
Government's power and initiative are, however, omitted from Preiser's 
analysis. 
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as a result of an artificially raised wage rate, i.e. of a wage rate 
that does not correctly represent the scarcity of labour. Rather the 
lower degree of employment corresponds to the essential facts of 
of the case, for supply is lower. It is, in a sense, voluntary unem-
ployment. Labour refuses to offer its services at the rates prevail-
ing or under the conditions offered. In any economy the quantities 
of labour and non-labour resources are available for their owners' 
but this means that they are not awaiting disposal, only that firs~ 
they have to be placed at the disposal of production. Behind the 
elasticity of supply lies the power embodied in 'property'. Where 
labour is completely divorced from ownership of 'land' (or other 
forms of income yielding sources except man's mental or physical 
capacities) the supply of labour is rigid; wherever the worker owns 
a certain amount of 'land', the labour supply is elastic and the 
wage rate higher quite irrespective of the market form. Capital ow-
nership is a foundation much more stable than, say, a collective 
monopoly- of workers which could limit the supply of labour in a 
market economy only by artificial means, and, by its very nature 
orily temporarily. 
This idea could be applied to the Maltese labour supply, in ge-
neral, and to local agricultural land, in particular. No attempts at 
quantitative testing are made: interest is set upon the qualitative 
content of the argument and its policy implications. 
Labour supply elasticity in the Maltese economy could be ex-
pected to be influenced by a series of factors inc luding the -acade-
mic or technical training and the social esteem associated with a 
task; the close family relationships enabling a household to finan-
cially support a young man or woman - this could be a function of 
a family's size and wealth; the possibility of continuing family 
trade and turning oneself self-employed; the trends in female parti-
cipation rates; and the prospects of emigration. Other factors would 
be social security benefit schemes; assistance under the National 
insurance plan; and temporary employment in para-statal bodies, 
such as the Pioneer Labour Corps. 
These factors could operate simultaneously, or individually, for 
particular cases, but their net effect would determine the dated lo-
cation and the shape of the aggregate labour supply schedule, al-
though they would represent varying degrees of importance when 
applied to selected economic sectors. 
In the immediate post-war period, employment in Malta centred 
upon primary industries (agriculture, fishing, stone quarrying); the 
U.K. Defence Establishment and the Public Service Departments; 
and a diversified complex of self-employ,ed or very small units. 
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The mentality behind j ob acceptance was work stability and per-
sonal freedom in time allocation. This attitude persists; the Mal-
tese worker, generally speaking, appears to be selective as regards 
job conditions, remuneration and timing of accepting or refusing 
employment. 
Over the nineteensixties, opposing influences could be discern-
ed in operation tending both to change the then-established labour-
supply schedule and to affect its shape or elasticity by determining 
the response of labour to money income changes. Three factors, 
Female Activity Rates, Self-Employment and Emigration are select-
ed from those enumerated above and their relative influence upon 
labour's supply elasticity analysed. The first factor tends to re-
duce elasticity; the other two tend to incre'ase it. The final out-
come per time period depends upon the relative strength of every 
factor. The three elements chosen could be considered to have a 
wider application in the Maltese economy than the rest which tend 
to influence decision making of a restricted number of labour units. 
Table 4 classifies the productive sectors in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in terms of the mean periodic percentage composi-
tion going to Wages and Salaries and income accruing to self-em-
ployment. 
Table 4 
INCOME FROM SELF-EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS IN THE 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Period Averages: Percent) 
SECTOR 1955-58 1959-63 1964-68 1968-73 i 
Agriculture and Fishing 92.19 94.35 92.86 94.16 . 
Wholesale and Retail 92.96 89.68 90.07 87~90 
Insurance, Banking and 
Real Estate 66.67 79.15 78.02 69.79 
Construction and 
Quarrying 12.15 15.18 18.23 19.88 
Manufacturing 56.80 32.64 36.57 32.58 
Private Services 56.49 51.14 43.05 35.51 
Public Administration NIL 
Military Services NIL 
Source: Based on Table 11 'National Accounts of the Maltese Is-
lands' • 
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The first category represents the traditional household busines-
es and self-employed units, where emphasis.1ies upon liquid funds 
rather than mechanisation (physical capital), namely agriculture, 
fishing and commerce. The incremental observation in construction 
and quarrying (though low percentagewise in self-activity) indicates 
the changes in this sector's employment status over the sixtie s. 
Private services and II.1anufacturing registered a decline as the re-
latively large industrial and tourist units, demanding comparative-
ly heavy investment and employing large numbers of workers, as-
sumed a dominant role in this category. Self employment is nil in 
the fourth group. 
The influence upon the elasticity of labour supply could be il-
lustrated from Agriculture. It is observed that the number of whole-
time farmers experienced a steady decline over the twenty-year per-
iod, 1950-1970. The work conditions and the financial compensa-
tions are not sufficiently rewarding to retain the rising generation 
born in agricultural families. Ideas about a fixed work-week and a 
regular wage-payment have been endorsed by this social group, 
depleting the agricultural population. Moreover, as educational op-
portunities w·ere extended, young people became more selective in 
their choice of work. The result was that fariners-to-be emigrated 
or transferred their labour-services to the other sectors, those un-
skilled mainly into the construction and quarrying industries. 
However, once the economic sectors, in which new employment 
was found, underwent a decline in activity, it is observed that the 
labour movement out of the agricultural group is arrested and a 
slight increase even registered. 19 If this pattern repeats itself, 
with marginal changes in the numbers of farmers tending to move 
inversely with the level of activity in the rest of the economy, one 
could forward the hypothesis that unskilled or semi-skilled wor-
kers whose families work land and, therefore, could provide an im-
mediate buffer activity yielding a return, feel they have the option 
to decide when to leave the trade, at what price and where to move. 
Wages need be above stipulated minimums, varying among indi vid-
uals but still valid to apply in relevant quantities for the economy; 
working conditions illust be attractive enough to make men leave 
the family'S trade and become wage-earners. As the manpower di-
rectly engaged in agriculture declines and the remaining labour 
units are utilised better, the return per unit of labour could be ex-
pected to rise. Specific courses in agricultural technique improve-
ment and a better organised marketing network, could raise further 
19 See Agricultural Census Reports for 1972, 1973. 
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this sector's average yield and act as a constraint upon the out-
flow of labour. 
Emigration constitutes a more influential factor. Table 5 pre-
sents data for 1957-1973 period of migrants aged 15 to 16, i.e. 
those who form part of the labour force. 2o Emigrating individuals or 
households have to face, and overcome, two social barriers: lan-
guage and a way-of-life based upon very restricted geographical 
dimensions. Young people, academically trained and/or guided by 
relatives and voluntary or State organisations, find emigration less 
discouraging. With inter-country mobility possible, and with chang-
es in personal outlooks, labour supply elasticity could, in prin-
ciple, reach any value. A worker's strength in bargaining, shown 
in the choice of the country of work and the re lated rate 0 f pay-
ment within a sector, is increased; the possibility of an alternative 
employment increases supply elastici ty. 
Table 5 
EMIGRATION DATA (EMIGRANTS AGED 15-60) AND THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 1957 - 1973 
EMIGRATION % OF LABOUR FORCE UNEMPLOYME~T 
YEAR MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE % OF LABOUR FORCE 
1957 1584 857 2441 1.792 0.969 3.714 
1958 1435 871 2306 1.554 0.943· 3.719 
1959 1516 828 2344 1.666 0.910 3.541 
1960 1738 1033 2771 1.879 1.118 4.079 
1961 1739 941 2680 1.858 1.006 4.667 
1962 1647 1138 2885 1.768 0.869 6.823 
1963 2737 1908 2643 2.927 2.039 7.501 
1964 420S 2460 6668 4.468 4.170 8.117 
. 1965 3389 2338 5727 3.531 3.867 8.189 
1966 1802 1376 3178 1.S51 1.414 8.072 
1967 1674 1232 2906 1.696 1.277 5.463 
1968 1369 959 2328 1.369 0.959 4.199 
1969 1276 827 2103 1.223 0.793 3.659 
1970 1290 826 2116 1.216 0.779 4.677 
1971 1356 85S 2214 1.21 0.76 5.44 
1972 1466 1029 2495 1.34 2.28 5.96 
19731 1889 1272 3161 1.75 1.18 4.54 
- -----
20 Note that the denominator representing the labour force has not been ad-
justed; ratios are based upon data for the end of December of every year. 
Still the statistics should enable us to formulate a general impression 
about the potential annual unemployment 'disguised' in migration outflow. 
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The unemployment equivalent of. female emigrants should not be 
interpreted at the above rates. The statistics should be adjusted to 
allow for certain social factors, such as those married women who 
would probably have remained in the home and would not have 
sought outside work. Still, it is observed that the male emigration 
rate annually amounted to about one half of the total unemployed 
rate until 1966, the year that marked the first signs of the con-
struction boom with its sectoral employment multiplier effects. 
Emigration, though socially and economically disruptive, could be-
come a regulating force that establishes the level of wages accept-
able in industry by male labour. The absolute wage level set by 
labour groups would determine, in turn, the feasible range of pro-
duction techniques, given the other costs, and thereby influence 
the type of enterprises instituted. 
Normally, the interpretation given to the association between 
emigration and wages is not the one suggested. Reasoning usually 
links insufficient employment outlets with the movement of indi-
viduals out of the island. This relation is a strong one, of course; 
but the element now emphasized in the decision of a man to emi-
grate is that since his aspirations of wage and work conditions 
can not be adequately fulfilled in a locality, it would be personally 
welfare increasing to move elsewhere once such possibility exists. 
Such decisions would influence the Maltese labour force, by reduc-
ing the number of those seeking work - thus depressing social an-
xiety preoccupied with providing short-run employment outlets -
and, more important, influence production techniques by permitting 
the install~tion of relatively more capital intensive industries -
given local borrowing costs, and so guarant'ee higher labour remu-
neration rates. In time, following a decline in the birth rate, thus 
reducing the rate of increase of the labour force, . and following an 
exp'ansion of domestic productive units, the outflow of migrants 
would be reduced. 
A rising female activity rate, on the other hand, tends to reduce 
labour force supply elasticity. The working horizon of the Maltese 
female outside the home has been generally short. The young wo-
man plans to get herself employed for a few years before m'arriage; 
what has mattered for the young woman has been the need to save 
money in order to reduce the financial burden on her family when 
she takes up the married status. (The desire to be free from parent-
al control would constitute another strong motive; but this urge is 
not considered here.) Her planned 'employment span' would depend 
upon her educational training, her social class, and the financial 
assistance she expects to obtain from her family. If the employment 
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opportunit~es available are not as remunerating as she hopes for, 
and even If they offer no promotion outlets, she would not opt for 
emigration but would probably undertake to benefit from them. 
Whereas the young man would be reluctant to accept a j ob upon a 
permanent basis unless wage exceeds a minimum or unless he 
could count upon the possibility of future promotion or upon the 
opportunity of taking up an additional job outside work, the young 
woman planning her work career on a shorter time horizon, would 
accept the job. Female participation rate has maintained an upward 
trend - 17.9% in 1959 and 29.5% in 1973 (planned to rise to 35.5% 
by 1979). 
The availability of labour determines the wages offered, given 
demand. To the extent, therefore, that supply is relatively elastic 
for male workers but inelastic for female workers, wages in those 
sectors operated by male labour would register higher wages than 
otherwise. Higher wages could reduce employment in a unit (though 
it need not do so if the profit margin in time is wide enough to act 
as a buffer against reasonable increase in the wage bill.) But they 
could act as an incentive to an efficient running of a firm; disguis-
ed unemployment is reduced to a minimum if not entirely eliminat-
ed. Those sectors employing exclusively female operators could 
offer lower wages than economically warranted and still recruit 
personnel; wages in such sectors could be raised through the acti-
vity of labour organisations. In those sectors in which the worker's 
sex is unimportant, wages are set at a level initially indicated by 
management, probably at a lower level than economically feasible; 
intervention through industrial action or Wages Council would raise 
the rates paid. If the assumption of an initial under-valued payment 
is correct, wage increases, up to a level differing among industries 
and intra-industry plants, would not damage the competitiveness of 
an enterprise; workers would be being paid what, in a private en-
terprise system, would be computed their contribution to the pro-
duction of a commodity. The introduction of a national mi~imum 
wage in 1974, and equality of pay for work, irrespective of sex, by 
1976, help establish the minimum wages that could be paid in in-
dustry and tourism, but not, of course, an upper limit. 
The above application of Preiser's idea may directly affect func-
tional shares in part because emigration does not entitle a labour 
unit to a share in the Maltese GNP. But self-employment would: a 
man becomes a wage-earner (imputed) a.nd an owner of property. 
In addition, Preiser's conclusion could be forwarded as an argu-
ment for labour participation in management and profits. The im-
portant issue becomes the achievement of a degree of equity with-
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out stifling growth. It could be that the optimal solution would be 
to offer a group of workers a share not in their product but in the 
product of others; workers would participate in the management of 
the enterprise in which. they are employed while they would be giv-
en the opportunity, as individuals or as corporate entities, to own 
shares in other business units. 
It should be emphasized that the ownership of capital, apart from 
influencing the personal income distribution, could affect the func-
tional shares by turning workers into units part! y independen t from 
their labour source of earnings thus enabling them to resist the 
terms offered and raise their wages and/or better their work condi-
tions. This is bound to produce an impact upon the internal distri-
bution of a firm's product, given the price of final OUtput as is the 
case confronting the Maltese firm. 
Gi ven the market conditions and the profit considerations eval-
uated in the previous section, trade unions could demand participa-
tion in profits through a firm's annual contributions reflecting pro-
ductivity and sales; this, as suggested already, could take the 
form of an agreed percentage of disposable profits which would go 
to benefit an insurance or investment fund for the workers. If the 
weekly pay-packet is sufficient to retain the workers cooperative, 
the future benefits could be interpreted as investment (savings) for 
the employees. The value of the appropriated profits could be in-
cluded in the workers' share similar to the social insurance con-
tributions by employers. The 'measured effect upon functional dis-
trihution would depend upon the interpretation given to these funds 
by the firm: whether they are regarded as costs prior to estimating 
net profit, or, what seems logical, to consider them as profit's 
shares. Functional distribution could remain unaltered; but person-
al distribution, more important from a social angle, would be mo-
dified in favour of the workers. 
The interrelationship between the elasticity of factor supply and 
relative shares could be also applied to the utilisation of arable 
land. Land is leased to individuals, normally at a low nominal fee, 
especially in those areas not considered suitable for dwellings 
construction and development. Though the payments are regularly 
paid by the tenants - full-time or part-time farmers or game hun-
ters - yet areas left uncultivated, season after season, are fairly 
common. The low rental is not burden-some upon an individual; the 
tenant has no incentive to terminate the lease. Effort is not pro-
duced although land is available. The gradual efficient organisa-
tion of the agricultural sector, demanding investment in irrigation 
systems and tenancy consolidation, would raise the yield on agri-
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cultural investment and increase the opportunity costs of leaving 
cultivable land idle. An increase in output would induce extensive 
as well as intensive cultivation of land. The observed shares ac-
cruing to factor labour - hired and imputed in the case of self-em-
ployed - and to factor capital - profits and rentals - would de-
pend upon the price of products and upon the accounting technique 
adopted. Reorganisation within this sector should activate idle 
land, thus eliciting work effort leading to increased output and 
higher absolute returns to both labour and non-labour factors. 
CAPITAL/LABOUR INTENSITIES AND DYNAMIC PLANNING 
Maltese Public Authorities have propagated the idea among fo-
reign investors that local factor labour is abundant and relatively 
intra-sectorally immobile, in an attempt to accelerate nascent pro-
ductive investment and ease the social pressure of unemployment. 
Time and emigration constituted a pressing element for the Govern-
ment though not necessarily for the outward-looking individual or 
household. The incentive scheme assistance during the sixties 
was positively correlated to the amount of labour units employed 
by a firm, unwarrantedly creating the temptation for investors to in-
flate the projected manpower required to assist in production out-
put. Inflated labour projections meant a higher financial grant, a 
reduction in own-capital outlay and an automatic rise in the effect-
ive rate of return. 21 Preferential treatment was given to those pro-
2lThe effective rate of return can be illustrated by a simple hypothetical 
example which stressed the importance of distinguishing between 'private' 
and 'social' rates of return. 
Factory Construction cost + land = £M 40 
Cost of machinery & equipment 100 
£M140 
Assume the firm is given £M30 in grants. 
So: Firm's Investment from own sources: £M70 (£M1QO - 30) 
Government's investment 70 (40 + 30) 
Suppose that the end of the first year profit amount to £M28. This figure 
gives a yield equal to 20% on Total Investment (i.e. £M140). and 40% on 
the firm's investment (£M70). 
So while the nominal rate is 20%, the effective rate for the firm (private 
rate of return) is double that value. If profits persist at that rate and are 
withdrawn the payback period would be reduced to 2~ years as against 5 
years if total investment - machinery plus factor construction - were 
considered. Projects may be profitable from the short-term firm's point of 
view but could possibly be rej ected· if evaluated from a social, long-term 
angle. 
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jects which utilised a lower capital/labour (K/L) ratio for given 
output. 
As noted already, an economy in trans!tlOn must innovate. Entre-
preneurs are faced with a series of innovations of which they are 
assumed to select the optimal, given the actual (present) and the 
expected (future) economic conditions, and apply it to a particular 
industry. Innovations generally fall into two classes: product-in-
novations and process-innovations. The terms are self-explanatory. 
Though distinction is fairly easy in principle, yet it is difficult to 
hold in the real world for the introduction of a cost-reducing pro-
cess is sometimes accompanied by a change in the product mix. 22 
In setting up a production process, firms follow experience. The 
competitive firm cannot rationally decide upon a particular level of 
production without some estimate of future product and factor 
prices. It is not sufficient to have 'primary information' about tech-
nical production possibilities, consumers' preferences and current 
input -prices. To determine the profitability of investment, firms 
must also be acquainted with 'secondary information' which en-
ables them to form expectations of future sales and prices realis-
tically, i.e. facilitates the dynamic projection of future costs and 
revenues. This type of information takes the form of known re-
straints on rival behaviour which makes it possible to estimate the 
range of competing supply at a future date. To survive the inno-
vator must adapt production processes to relative factor scarcities, 
and should be prepared to adjust, so far as indivisibilities of ca-
pital allow, production to changes in factor scarcities. 
When real investment is cheap relative to labour, standards of 
obsolescence could be assumed to be stringent and the spread bet-
22 Economic theory classifies innovations as 'labour saving' and 'c.apital 
saving' on the assumption of two production factors. Following the Hicks-
Robinson definition a 'labour saving' innovation is one which raises the 
marginal productivity of capital relative to that of labour at a given capi-
tal-labour ratio employed in producing a given output; and conversely for 
a 'c-apital saving' innovation. Note that neo-classical distribution models 
interpret changes in relative factor shares following growth or innovations 
in terms of the elasticity of substitution with the \"alue of unity (in non-
vintage growth models) as the condition for constant relative shares. 
Kaldor N. introduced the concept of a 'technical progress function' as a 
substitute -for the aggregate production function and for the concepts-of 
'capital (Labour) saving'. 
See: Blaug M: 'A Survey of the Theory of Process Innovation' (Econo-
mica - February 1963). 
Kregel J.: op. c it Ch.9 
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ween the best and the average technique is narrow. A fall in inte-
rest rate or in equipment prices lowers the capital costs of adopt-
ing the best-practice technique, while a rise in the wage rate in-
creases the operating costs of averaged priced techniques; both 
tend to induce the scrapping of old machines. On the other hand 
when real investment is dear relative to labour, the capital struc-
ture of an industry would consist largely of outmoded equipment. 
The absorption of innovatory techniques relies upon the degree 
of technical dynamism of an economy, i.e. on the flow of new ideas 
and the readiness of the system to integrate them. Producers in 
Malta, at this stage of development, have to import ideas and know-
how. Originality in commodity presentation could be easier to 
create in the sector of tourism; but this industry pertains to a 
genre of its own. To the extent that products manufactured in Mal-
ta are 'unique', favourably planned, produced and directed to spe-
cific markets, ideas could originate in the island. These, however, 
require the appearance of a new generation of Maltese producers 
reared up in a 'manufacturing and marketing' environment and con-
versant with the investor's and the saleman's language, style and 
approach. On the other hand, to the extent that exports retain the 
characteristics of a high elastic demand, and are geared to meet 
commodity-supply gaps in foreign markets, conditions of produc-
tions are dictated abroad and have to be scrupulously followed. 
The following observations are directed towards this second type 
of products, to Tourism arid to ship repairing facilities. 
The incentive scheme operated to encourage investment was 
purposely heavily biased towards grants and tax-exemption. This 
meant that the original corporate private investment, but not total 
outlay - could be recovered in a shorter time span, i.e. the pay-
back period for the invested funds is reduced in inverse proportion 
to the ratio of grants, plus the cost of factory construction not in-
curred, to the total initial outlay. The higher this ratio the shorter 
the payback period, given annual revenue. The profitability of an 
investment in Malta would be higher and unrealistically promising 
if the yield is estimated upon the funds invested by the firm rathe.r 
than calculated upon the aggregate commitment. In an attempt to 
recoup quickly its original share, a firm might wi thdra w funds in 
excess of what would be desirable to allow for reinvestment pur-
poses, if any reinvestment plans exist in the first place. 
The investment incentive schemes operated were inherently in-
consistent. The lowering of capital costs through grants and inte-
rest-free loan should lead to the application of a labour saving 
technique, i.e. to a production method that raises the productivity 
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of capital in terms of a hypothetical K/L ratio in the instance of a 
newly established local unit. However, financial assistance was 
correlated to the number of jobs provided by the enterprise. It fol-
lows that techniques considered optimal in the absence of 'labour 
clauses' would be substituted by a process of a less technically 
advanced nature. The advantages that could have been gained from 
the reduction of capital costs would, as a consequence, fail to ma-
terialize. Labour employment would turn out to be in exces s of the 
optimal process requirements when dynamic considerations are ac-
counted for. Work stability would be threatened from the beginning 
and labour's share within a unit would perhaps be lower than it 
otherwise could have been. For, in order to anticipate future wage 
increases, the rates initially offered would be purposely set at an 
economically-unwarranted low level; such level would simultan-
eously guarantee a very short payback period of own-invested 
funds. 
If this argument is valid, the investment-incentive scheme could 
be considered a means of creating and sustaining temporarily dis-
guised unemployment. A fixed technical re lationship would be mo-
dified on purpose by the projected engagement of superfluous la-
bour when a firm applies for assistance; the promised target, if im-
plemented, would undermine the stability of the enterprise. Given 
the labour supply elasticity conditions described above, a rise in 
wages in those industries employing male labour could lead to the 
streamlining of production, reduce employment (or the rate of in-
crease of labour intake following firm's expansion) but raise la-
bour's share to what it should have been in the first place. La-
bour's share in those units operated by female workers could be 
affected under supply rigidity, only if the supply curve shifts in-
wards, denoting lower employment, (or a lower growth rate of fe-
male employment in terms of demand) at higher wage rates. 
In the absence of a capital-goods sector in the Maltese econo-
my, analysis is restricted solely to the consumption-goods produc-
ing units. Intersectoral factor mobility and changes in factor prices 
do not behave as two-sector economic models postulate. The var-
iable element that could be controlled with some success is the 
cost of labour dynamically estimated, i.e. growing at a rate per 
time period. The cost of physical capital goods is determined OUt-
side the Maltese economic system; this would also be true for lo-
cal savings (liquid assets) in the absence of exchange restric-
tions. With exchange controls, the cost of local borrowing could 
also be regulated at a cost to the financial institution and depo si-
tors, and at a gain to foreign investors. 
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It is agreed, then, that industries established should reflect the 
factor supply conditions based upon current and future cost and re-
venue estimates. Prices, however, may not reflect the true factor 
market conditions for the price system may be inoperative. It has 
been repeatedly stated that labour-oriented industry should repre-
sent the optimal units for Malta. Labour-intensity cannot, however, 
be evaluated without including the financial outlay on fixed capi-
tal: thus we may get two 'equally' labour intensive industries in 
terms of running costs with completely different fixed asset struc-
ture, for example, ship repair and textiles. Surely one cannot com-
pare the initial costs of building a dock and workshops in a naval 
yard with the cOSts of setting up a textile factory even though the 
wage and salary content in the operation of both firms may be con-
sidered labour intensive. 
Still, the Maltese labour supply cannot be dynamically described 
as abundant; emigration and a decline in birth rate would regulate 
the natural growth of the labour force. It is true that over the six-
ties and seventies the labour supply for private industry has been 
augmented by the rise in female participation rate and the closure 
of the Defence Establishment, i.e. through structural unemployment 
superimposed on a post-war 'baby boom' and an altered conception 
of the social role of the woman. But such phenomena are intrinsi-
cally of a temporary nature. 
Neither could labour in Malta be classified as 'cheap' once due 
consideration is given to the duality in profit-motivation existing 
in the local economy and the relative importance of the sectors in 
which workers are freed from worries of competition in output and 
fluctuations in demand for their services. The latter's earnings are 
bound to structure the wage demands and the expectations of la-
bour in industry. The K/L ratio deemed feasible in another deve-
loping economy becomes socially unacceptable when critically 
studied in the Malta context. Production processes involving a 
higher K/L ratio than those artificially made to prevail under sta-
tic conditions and probably improving labour's rate and share ap-
pear desireable even at the socially unwanted cost of a higher 
trade-off in terms of emigration, or unemployment, or the creation 
of parastatal corps to absorb the unemployed and reduce the emi-
gration flow. 
The introduction of equal pay for equal work and the establish-
ing of a national minimum wage, coupled to the less attractive in-
centive programme (for the adventurous entrepreneur) introduced 
since 1971 should encourage reorganisation in the industrial units 
already established and instigate improved production techniques 
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in those projects still at the planning stage. Such modifications 
would affect both the functional shares and help improve the per-
sonal incomes of industrial labour. 
CONCLUSION 
The real objective of public policy should be man's welfare; 
therefore, the personal distribution of income should be the main 
end of government activities. However, transitional policies must 
be concerned, as a first step, with the functional distribution of 
income. Such policies, thought of macroeconomic ally, would indi-
cate the allocation plans of a market system within a socio-politi-
cal framework; public policies are meant to depart from a value 
based factor shares allocation and proceed to achieve the personal 
income-wealth-welfare distribution desirable. Such a task cannot 
be simple; it is inherently complex and dynamic. And, although in-
come or wealth distributions may be tuned to the planned patterns, 
there always remains the difficulty of correctly evaluating person-
al and social welfare. 
This paper introduced certain elements that can only be ignored 
at a cost. A factor share policy whether in nominal or in real terms 
could be omitted from the explicit considerations of public plan-
ners; but it is inevitably implied as the net outcome of several 
forces that, in the absence of deliberate thinking about the subject, 
could be cancelling out the posi ti ve contri burion everyone of them 
has to make. 
A functional share policy for Malta should take into account the 
following considerations: 
(i) the realisation of the demand for novel initiative undertak-
ings arising out of the production profit motive, and the tim e and 
the means required to enable a native entrepreneurial community to 
mature in terms of export-oriented competitive markets. 
(ii) the social implications in terms of asset-ownership arising 
out of the theoretical economic conclusion that growth favours a 
shift of resources towards factor capital. The adaptation and the 
implementation of an Aids to Industries Scheme together with the 
role of Government's direct participation in commodity producing 
would be regulated within the value judgements implied by diffe-
rent asset-ownership distribution criteria. 
(iii) the effects arising out of power in personal decision making 
vis-a-vis work, its reward and conditions following the ability of 
the Maltese worker to move between industries and between count-
ries. Having an alternative at hand strengthens an individual's 
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bargaining pOSItIOn; self-employment and emigration possibilities 
enable a man to resist offers for financial and non-financial rewards 
in work: Conversely, the limitation of self-employment outlets and 
control over migration outflow reduces the bargaining strength of 
labour enabling a shift towards factor capital and, possibly, rein-
vestment and economic growth. This idea should be judged in con-
nection with the previous observation about asset ownership. 
(iv) the capital-labour intensities in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors envisaged dynamically, i.e. in terms of expected changes 
in wages and other costs, and the rate of change in product prices. 
An investment decision, once taken, would control activity for a 
relatively long time; the small size of the Maltese economy does 
not allow enough scope for radical changes in production techni-
ques. The structure of enterprises' set-up are bound to determine 
sectoral activity and, through it, the fulfilment, or otherwise, of 
labour employed. Social stability and order demand that labour's 
aspirations, the desires of the majority, are adequately met. 
The problem is not as simple or as of secondary importance as 
it might casually appear to be. In a rapidly changing world short-
term policies, taken ad hoc, are essential: but an overall medium 
run view must never be lost out of sight. Economics is at its be st 
when long run considerations are made; however, short-run policies 
are essential as everyday experience shows and it is within the 
short-run frame that an interdisciplinary approach to a socio-econo-
mic problem becomes a necessity. Economics on its own would 
fail to achieve what it could attain with the assistance of other 
disciplines. So, politicians should not be relegated to a minor role 
for they are the men responsible for short-run adjustments; but nei-
ther can economic considerations be completely omitted, for scarce-
resource-allocation and its effects would certainly make themselves 
felt over the long run. 
Co-operation and mutual comprehension between active econo-
mic groups and public policy-makers are crucial for the organisa-
tion of a social economy in transition: an often repeated statement 
but unfortunately one whose real implications are hardly ever criti-
cally assessed. Failure to do so would make all the difference bet-
ween socio-economic stability and socio-economic unrest. 
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